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RÉSUMÉ. En partant du modèle généralisé de Osman Khodr et Francine Diener [1], nous présentons un nouveau modèle
qui répond aux attentes de l’institution de microfinance (IMF) et celle des emprunteurs et qui incorpore toutes les caracté-
ristiques des populations pauvres, à savoir la tolérance en cas de défaut partiel et la possibilité d’avoir un prêt progressif de
façon automatique. Ce modèle offrira aux institutions de microfinance un outil d’aide à la décision plus adapté à la réalité
de la microfinance. Notre chaîne de Markov comprend plusieurs états associés à la situation économique de l’emprunteur
dont trois types de bénéficiaires B1 (état d’être bénéficiaire au temps t = 0), B2 (état d’être bénéficiaire au temps t = 1)
et I (état d’inclusion financière: bénéficiaire permanent), un état de demandeur A1 et AT−1( (T − 1) états d’exclus).
Nous avons modélisé le comportement d’un emprunteur par un paramètre λ qui dépend de la probabilité α de réussite de
l’emprunteur. A l’instant initial, λ = 1+α
1−α
, cette quantité change dès que l’emprunteur passe d’un état à un autre avec une
probabilité de réussite différente de α. La décision de l’agence d’accorder un crédit dépend entièrement du paramètre λ
qui est comparé aux valeurs-seuils subjectives fixées. La chance γ d’avoir un prêt (γ: probabilité de demande de crédit
accordée) pour un emprunteur est fonction du paramètre λ, avec γ = 1− 1
λ
.
ABSTRACT. Starting from the generalized model of Osman Khodr and Francine Diener [1], we present a new model
that meets the expectations of the microfinance institution (MFI) and that of the borrowers and that incorporates all the
characteristics of the poor, namely tolerance in case of partial default and the possibility of having a progressive loan
automatically. This model will provide microfinance institutions with a decision support tool that is better adapted to the
reality of microfinance. Our Markov chain consists of several statements associated with the economic status of the
borrower including three types of recipients B1 (state of being beneficiary at a time t = 0 ), B2 (state to be beneficiary at a
time t = 1) and I (state of financial inclusion: permanent beneficiary), an applicant state A1 and AT−1 ((T − 1) excluded
states). We modeled a borrower’s behavior by a λ parameter that depends on the borrower’s α probability of success. At
the initial time, λ = 1+α
1−α
, this quantity changes as soon as the borrower moves from one state to another with a probability
of success different from α. The agency’s decision to grant a credit depends entirely on the λ parameter which is compared
to the set subjective threshold-values. The chance γ to have a loan (γ: probability of credit request granted) for a borrower
depends on the parameter λ, with γ = 1− 1
λ
.
MOTS-CLÉS : Microfinance, Décision d’octroi de crédit, chaîne de Markov, Prêt individuel, Incitation dynamique, Profit
espéré actualisé
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KEYWORDS : Microfinance, Credit Grant Decision, Markov Chain, Individual Loan, Dynamic Incentive, Updated Expected
Profit
1. Introduction
The microfinance institution (MFI) is an important lever for the economic development of the poor.
Despite this, some populations are not yet served by the system and others, already customers, are entering
a vicious circle of debt. Seen from this angle, is it not necessary that it must question their model of granting
credit to achieve not only this ultimate goal but also its sustainability ? Inspired by the learn method studied
of study by the economist G.A. Tedeschi [7], Osman Khodr and Francine Diener [2] built an individual
loan model using the spirit of successive loans as a dynamic incentive. Indeed, in the model of Osman
Khodr and Francine Diener, the MFI is threatened with two types of non-repayment : strategic defects or
defects resulting from an economic shock. According to this model, the loan agreement provides incentives
to discourage borrowers from following strategic flaws while considering an inevitable economic shock.
This model presents repayment incentives as the repeated interaction between borrower and lender : each
repayment of the loan at maturity leads to a new loan contract while excluding the defaulting borrower, for
some time, from the lending activity. Lansana Bangoura [5] stresses the importance of this to better manage
credit and to overcome the difficulties faced by the microfinance institution (MFI). In this regard, he proposes
as a possible solution the monetary bonus for the effort related to loan repayments.
The behavior of the borrower is unpredictable. This unpredictability makes the reality more complex.
But a model is good if it makes this complexity simpler and understandable. The generalized model of
Osman Khodr and Francine Diener does not take into account all the more advantageous techniques that can
be applied in the lending activity. Their model incorporates no flexibility in the decision : a zero-tolerance
model for the defaulting party (exclusion for a certain period of time), whether partial default or total default,
and a loan model of the same size for all future stages of the decision for a successful borrower. It is therefore
a question of extending the existing model for broad coverage and protection of participants. Thus, our
objective is to build an individual loan model that meets the expectations of the MFI (dynamic incentive) and
those of the borrowers (secure their daily life through a flexible offer adapted to their capacity to counter the
permanent risk of falling into the state of indigence). This model will take into account all the characteristics
of the poor and stigmatize them. Through this model, we hope to offer institutions a tool for decision-making
more adapted to the reality of everyday life. We consider here the non-monetary effort bonus presented in
Lansana Bangoura’s work as an automatic increase in the amount of credit and a fall in interest rate. Like
the Khodr and Diener model, we will use the Markov chain theory that we will not present here to achieve
the desired result.
Hypotheses describing all the possible states at maturity and the different procedures applied according
to the investment result, will be presented in the next section. Here we have taken up, among them, three
hypotheses of Khodr and Diener. We will present in the third section our model of individual loan. We will
finish our work by presenting the expected profit of the participants followed by a discussion.
2. Hypotheses
In addition to the assumptions made in the model of Khodr and Diener, as for our model, other hypotheses
have been added :
– (H1) : The MFI finances only existing activities. Any credit request for a new project is not admissible.
– (H2) : The expected gross wealth ws = (w1, w2, ..., wS) is a random variable dependent on the states
of nature.
– (H3) : The interest rate r, (0 < r ≤ 1) may vary according to the state of nature (a low rate for a
borrower who enters the circle of the permanent beneficiary (state I)). Let’s note rs the interest rate for a
state’s of nature.
– (H4)[2] : The borrower is successful if he pays back all of his loan, charged an interest rate rs fixed at
the time of the contract and automatically receives a new loan from an additional unit or from the same unit
for the next period.
– (H5)[2] : The borrower is in default if he has not repaid, therefore, he will not receive a new loan for
following T (T ≥ 1) periods.
– (H6)[2] : After the exclusion, he applies for a new loan and his chance depends on the number of
eligible applicants and the limit on the number of borrowers in the loan portfolio. For the first period follo-
wing the exlusion let’s note their application acceptance probability as γ (0 ≤ γ ≤ 1), while 1 − γ is the
probability that his candidacy will be postponed for the next period, and so on.
– (H7) : It is only in the first contract that the IMF tolerates, at most, d(1 ≤ d ≤ 3) partial defaults of
repayement for a lump sum p as a penalty for each defect. If the borrower exceeds the number d authorized
defects, they will be excluded for a period of time. Otherwise, a renewal of a new loan of the same size will
be possible.
From these assumptions and from the fact that the borrower predicts his future from his present state but
not from his past, we model the different states of a borrower by a Markov chain. The use of the Markovian
process allows us to evaluate the expected inter-temporal profit of the borrower.
3. The model
3.1. Related works
Many economists have worked on dynamic lending incentives. Among them, we quote Hulme and Mos-
ley [9], Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch [8], and Ghosh and Van Tassel [6] who, in their studies, built
exclusively two-period models . Lansana Bangoura [5] builds an optimal loan contract model based on an
effort oriented bonus to mitigate the problem of moral hazard and adverse selection. Tedeschi [7], for his
part, adapted the two-step dynamic of Green and Porter [10] to build a model that takes into account all
future stages of the borrower. For their part, Nahla Dhib, Francine Diener and Marc Diener [3] presented
a four-state model that mathematically models, with the Markov chain, the evaluation of the impact of mi-
crocredit to reach a large number of individuals with low income. Convinced that some aspects of this will
advance research in the field of mathematical modeling in microfinance, Osman Khodr and Francine Diener
[2] have generalized the Tedeschi [7] model and the four state model of Nahla Dhib, Francine Diener and
Marc Diener [3] while automatically renewing the loan and keeping the same size, when the borrower does
not default and in the oppositi case nothing. Osman Khodr and Francine Diener put in their model the em-
phasis on determining the optimal contract between the borrower and the lender. They assume that, in all
future stages, the contracting parties have an activity that lasts for several periods.
As this is an extension of the model of Osman Khodr and Francine Diener [2], our model stands out for
its ability to better explain, on the one hand, the behavior the MFI should have in its moves to offer credit or
loan and build a stable relation of trust with its customer, and, on the other hand, that of the business person
in order to be able to benefit from the possibility a progressive and continuous financing if their project.
3.2. Presentation of the model
In entrepreneurship, it is universally accepted that the use of borrowed funds (combined funds : equity
and borrowed funds) generates more profits than passed to equity. Thus, to undertake an income-generating
activity, obtaining credit for financing is a prerequisite for success. On the other hand, to get a loan contract
is to take risks related to the project to be financed. These risks are sometimes predictable and unpredictable
hazards (states of nature) that interfere with the credit decision and shape the behavior of borrowers to meet
their responsibility and commitment.
Let’s note S the number if nature states. For each nature state s, two cases can arise, either the borrower
repays his loan, or he fails. Our model provides a partial fault tolerance (Hypothesis H7), but the total failure
costs it an exclusion for several periods and places it in a plaintiff state. Thus, the S states of nature are as
follows :
S = {B1, B2, I, A
T , A(T−1), . . . , A1}
Where B1 represents the profit state of the first loan, B2 that of the second loan of the same unit as the
previous one or more than one additional unit according to the needs of the contractor (u(B2) ≥ u(B1)
where u(B1) denotes the unit loaned to the state B1 (according to the Hypothesis H5). I is the state where
the borrower automatically enters the circle of the permanent beneficiary. As for AT , it is the state where
the contractor will be excluded for T periods as a result of exceeding the number of defects d authorized
repayment and A1 is the state of a loan applicant. Since the decision to grant credit depends only on the
beneficiary’s recent past, the exclusive use of Markovian theory as a methodological tool has been of great
help. In this respect, we have assigned to each state of nature a probability called the Markov chain probabi-
lity describing all possible states of the beneficiary during the contract. Thus, the stochastic matrix P of the
chain from one state to another is :
P =


αls α
h
s 0 1− αs 0 0 · · · 0 0
0 0 βs 1− βs 0 0 · · · 0 0
0 0 1− θs θs 0 0 · · · 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 · · · 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 · · · 0 0
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0 0 0 0 0 0 · · · 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 · · · 0 1
γ 0 0 0 0 0 · · · 0 1− γ


And the following figure represents the Markov graph associated with the P pass matrix
Figure 1. Markov graph with probabilities of transition from one state to another
B1 B2 I A
T AT−1 · · · Ai Ai−1 · · · A1
αls
1− γ
1− θs
γ
1− αs1− βs
αhs βs θs 1 1
The transition matrix represents the proportions of beneficiaries and loan seekers in different states of
nature. We are also seeking to know how these proportions will evolve over time. Moreover, institutions that
provide business person with the means of financing their micro business are seeking a system of balance
of credit. This system of balance allows the agency not to put too much emphasis on one parameter at
the expense of another (for example, for a given MFI, increasing the probability α can be summed up as
not granting only when it can secure a high chance of project success, but it will be at the expense of the
γ probability since more credit applications would then have to be rejected). However, the rejection of a
greater proportion of demands is displacing MFIs from their rationale : to promote access to finance for the
entire poor population. The income that a borrower will earn on a unit invested is generally uncertain. The
model therefore offers the borrower the default policy prevention constraint and the continvity constraint.
This behavior is studied according to the states that occur in the sequence (X1, X2, · · · , Xn) of n transitions.
The "Beneficiary-Beneficiary" event is a transition from having a loan and staying there. Let Ω = BB be this
event and λ the parameter that models the behavior of a borrower, with λ = NΩ
NB
where NB is the number of
times to have a loan in the sequence, NB =
∑
n≥1 1{Xn=B} and NΩ is the number of times to be successful
in the sequence, NΩ =
∑
n≥1 1{Xn=B,Xn+1=B} and 1 is an indicator function.
Let’s set τ = inf{n ≥ 1 : Xn = B} and put the three states where the borrower has credit into a B
state (B = {B1, B2, I}). Let S′ denote the new states with S′ = {B,AT , A(T−1), . . . , A1}. At the initial
time, the chain chooses a state according to the initial law µ, note B this state and stays there for a duration
of geometric law on N∗ of parameter q(B,B). When this time has elapsed, the chain randomly chooses a
new state following the probability q(B, .)/(1− q(B,B)), with q(B,B) 6= 1.
Proposition 1. : Let (Xn, n ≥ 1) a Markov chain with values in S.
Let’s put S′ = {AT , A(T−1), . . . , A1}, for k ≥ 2, we have : {τ = k} = {X1 ∈ S′′, · · · , Xk−1 ∈
S′′, Xk = B}.
PB(τ = k) =PB(X1 ∈ S
′′, · · · , Xk−1 ∈ S
′′, Xk = B)
=(1− q)k−2q
So
E(τB) =
∑
n≥2 k(1− q)
k−2q
=
∑
n≥1(k + 1)(1− q)
k−1q
=q(
∑
n≥1 k(1− q)
k−1 +
∑
n≥1(1− q)
k−1)
=q( 1
q2
+ 1
q
)
=
q+1
q
From this NB 7−→ qq+1 when n→∞.
Let EBk be the kth entry time in B and let DBk be the duration of the kth residence time in B. DBk is the
integer NΩ which checks : {XEB
k
= B, · · · , XEB
k
+i−1 = B,XEB
k
+i 6= B}. XEB
k
+DB
k
is the place where
the chain jumps out of B. With these ratings, we have :
PB(XEB
k
= B, · · · , XEB
k
+i = B,XEB
k
+i+1 6= B/E
B
k <∞) =PB(D
B
k = i+ 1/E
B
k <∞)
=qk(B,B)(1− q(B,B))
So
E(DBk ) =
∑
n≥1 kq
k(B,B)(1− q(B,B))
=(1− q)q
∑
n≥1 kq
k−1
=
(1−q)q
(1−q)2
=
q
1−q
Hence NB 7−→ q1−q when n → ∞. The parameter λ thus prends its value by the data of the parameter
q. So, λ = q+11−q . By setting two thresholds λmin and λmax, she will make her decision as follows :
1) if λ < λmin, the borrower will be excluded from the lending activity for T following periods
(Assumptions H5 et H6).
2) if λ > λmax, the borrower will receive a new loan of a higher amount according to his needs
and/or benefit from a reduced rate (Hypothèses H3 et H4).
3) if λ ∈ [λmin, λmax], the borrower will continue to benefit from the loan of the same amount and
the same interest rate (Hypothesis H7).
3.3. Constraints imposed on model variables
According to the study by Osman Khodr and Francine Diener, three types of constraints are assigned to
their model, namely : the participation constraint, the constraint of preventing the default strategy and the
continuity constraint. As for our model, no change has been made to these constraints.
3.3.1. The constraint of participation
One of the necessary and sufficient conditions for granting credit is the financial viability of the project.
A project is financially viable if the expected wealth will largely cover the loan repayment. Thus, assuming
that the expected gross wealth in the s state of nature, of a unit invested, is Ws(Ws ≥ 0) positive on success
and zero otherwise the participation constraint is as follows :


W1
.
.
.
WS

 ≥


1
.
.
.
1

+


r1
.
.
.
rS


For the sake of simplification, we simply write : Ws ≥ 1 + rs.
3.3.2. The default policy prevention constraint
Given the high risk of non-repayment in microfinance, it seeks to protect itself while creating a dynamic
incentive strategy : automatically benefit from a new loan in case of repayment and exclude for T periods in
case of default . For a rational borrower who is risk averse, the restraint constraint that is interpreted as an
opportunity cost is written :
Ws − (1 + rs + C) + δV (s/s− 1 = B) ≥Ws + δV (s/s− 1 = A
T )
Where C is the incompressible consumption, δ the discount rate, V (s/s−1 = B) the expected net future
profit of a loan recipient, and V (s)/s− 1 = AT ) is that of an excluded for T periods.
The business person must choose after calculating the opportunity cost of continuing to be a credit
recipient or falling into the applicant’s state where he or she may remain for a lifetime. The establishment of
the central credit risk allows to strengthen the default strategy prevention.
3.3.3. The continuity constraint
As a financial intermediary, each credit grant of one unit costs the agency, in a s state of nature, a certain
sum zs. In order to ensure the continuity of the loan activity, the expected reimbursement amount must cover
the cost of the loan. Thus, the continuity constraint results :
(
α1 · · · αS
)


1 r1
.
.
. +
.
.
.
1 rS

≥


1 z1
.
.
. +
.
.
.
1 zS


Where αs represents the probability of success of the borrower’s project in the s state of nature. αs is
the probability that depends on the state s and values the outcome of the contractor’s project. Thus, it is
determined by the data of the y(Ws, rs) function of the net profit, from a unit loaned u(s) to a possible state
s invested in the project, before tax of the contractor : αs = y(Ws,rs)u(s) = Ws−(1+rs+C)u(s) [3] 1.
4. The participants expected profit
4.1. At the level of the borrower
4.1.1. Enjoy a period
If we consider a project for which we are considering S possible states of nature (eg favorable and
neutral : possibility of repayment, unfavorable : default of repayment), with αs the probability of success of
this project and 1− αs otherwise, the profit of a period, of a unit invested is :
αs[Ws − (1 + rs) + C]
The approach consists of determining the different intertemporal benefits expected for all future periods and
for each possible state of nature.
1. The authors evaluate the probability of success according to the investment result. We have adopted this formula by
modifying certain aspects
4.1.2. Total profit return
Définition 1. : Let (Xt, t ≥ 1) be a Markov chain. we assume that for any positive function, bounded f and
for each trajectory (Xm, Xm+1, . . .) of the Markov chain, we define : Let f : S ∗ S → R describe the profit
of an investment period, such as :
f(s = B/s− 1 = B1) =


Ws − (1 + rs + C + (p ∗ d)) if (s, s− 1) = (B1, B1), d = 1 at 3
Ws − (1 + rs + C) if (s, s− 1) = ((B2, B1)and (I,B2))
Ws − (1 + r¯s + C) if (s, s− 1) = (I, I)
0 if not
(1)
Where r¯s is the reduced interest rate of a beneficiary who can build a stable relationship of trust with the
MFI (with r¯s ≤ rs). This function represents the profit of passage between two states of the Markov chain.
Proposition 2. : Let (Xt, t ≥ 1) be a Markov chain. We assume that for any positive function, bounded f
and for each trajectory (Xm, Xm+1, . . .) of the Markov chain, we define :
F (Xm, Xm+1, . . .) =
∑
t≥1 δ
t−m−1f(Xt−1, Xt)
Demonstration : We will evaluate this function by using the Markov property and discounting the ex-
pected cash flow at the future of standard base period, with a discount rate δ(0 < δ < 1), for this we note
that :
F (Xm, Xm+1, . . .) =f(Xm, Xm+1) + δF (Xm+1, Xm+2, . . .)
=f(Xm, Xm+1) + δ(f(Xm+1, Xm+2) + δF (Xm+2, Xm+3, . . .))
=f(Xm, Xm+1) + δf(Xm+1, Xm+2) + δ
2(f(Xm+2, Xm+3)+
δF (Xm+3, Xm+4, . . .))
=
∑
t≥1 δ
t−m−1f(Xt−1, Xt)
Définition 2. : Let (Xt, t ≥ 1) a Markov chain with values in a S state space compared to a filtration
(gt; t ≥ 1) transition matrix P , let m a time out compared to the same filtration, almost surely finished, the
total net profit expected at time t depending on the state s of nature, s ∈ S, (Xt = s) by Vt : S 7→ R, for
any function f bounded is such that :
Vt(s) = E[F (Xt, Xt+1, . . . , /Xt = s)] = V0(s)
Indeed, we will proceed to the evaluation of the conditional expectation
E[F (Xm, Xm+1, . . . , Xm+t/gm)]. For any integer t, {m ≤ t} is a set of gt or equivalently {m = t} is
a set of gt and we suppose further that P(m < +∞) = 1. We note then that {m = k} is in gk and that
F (X0, X1, . . . , Xt) is an independent random variable from gk.
Vt(s/s− 1) = E[F (Xm, Xm+1, . . . , Xm+t/Xm = s− 1)]
=
∑
k≥0 E(P(m = k)F (Xk, Xk+1, . . . , Xk+t/Xk = s))
=f(Xm, Xm+1) + δf(Xm+1, Xm+2) + δ
2(f(Xm+2, Xm+3)+
(
∑
k≥0 P(m = k))(E(F (X0, X1, . . . , Xt/X0 = s)))
=
∑
t≥1 δ
t−m−1f(Xt−1, Xt)
=E[F ((X0, X1, . . . , Xt/X0 = s− 1))]
=V0(s/s− 1)
This proves that (Xm, Xm+1, . . . , Xm+t) has the same law as (X0, X1, . . . , Xt) and we can deduce that
Vt(s/s− 1) = V0(s/s− 1). So just determine V0(s/s− 1) for any state s ∈ S of nature.
According to the proposal (2),
V0(s/s− 1) = E((f(X0, X1) + δF (X1, X2, . . .))/X0 = s− 1)
Applying the conditional expectation and the Markov property, we obtain :
V0(s/s− 1) =
∑
(s,s+1,...∈S)(f(s− 1, s) + δV0(s/s− 1)) ∗ Ps−1,s
With Ps−1,s = P((Xt+1 = s/Xt = s− 1)) is the probability of transition, in a step, from state s− 1 to
state s. To determine the quantity V0(s/s− 1), three cases can occur :
– For {s− 1 = B1}, two cases can occur :
- First case : if the borrower defaults either partially or completely, the only accessible states in the chain
from the B1 state are B1 and AT (i.e s = B1 or AT ), with the following transition probabilities :
Ps−1,s =
{
αls if λ ∈ [λmin, λmax]⇒ s = B1
1− αs if λ < λmin ⇒ s = AT
(2)
with αhs the probability associated with the total repayment of the debt and αls that associated with the
partial refund, and check the relations αs = αls + αhs and αhs > αls.
So,
V0(s/s− 1 = B1) = (f(B1, B1) + δV0(s = B1/s− 1 = B1))PB1,B1 + (f(B1, A
T )
+δV0((s = A
T /s− 1 = B1))PAT ,B1
=αls(Ws − ((1 + rs) + C + (p ∗ d)) + δV0(s = B1/s− 1 = B1))
+(1− αs)(δV0(s = AT /s− 1 = B1))
- Second case : the borrower repays in full his loan without default. The only accessible state from the
state B1 is B2 with a transition probability PB1B2 = αhs if of course λ ∈ [λmin, λmax]⇒ s = B2.
So,
V0(s/s− 1 = B1) = (f(B1, B2) + δV0(s = B2/s− 1 = B1))PB2,B1
=αhs (Ws − ((1 + rs) + C) + δV0(s = B2/s− 1 = B1))
– For {s− 1 = B2}, the only accessible states of the chain from the state B2 are I and AT (i.e s = I or
AT ), with following transition probabilities :
Ps−1,s =
{
βs if λ ∈ [λmin, λmax]⇒ s = I
1− βs if λ < λmin ⇒ s = AT
(3)
Thus,
V0(s/s− 1 = B2) = (f(B2, I) + δV0(s = I/s− 1 = B2))PI,B2 + (f(B2, A
T ))
+δV0((s = A
T /s− 1 = B2))PB2,AT
=βs(Ws − (1 + rs) + δV0(s = I/s− 1 = B2))
+(1− βs)(δV0(s = AT /s− 1 = B2))
– For {s− 1 = I}, the only accessible states of the chain from the state I are I and AT (i.e s = I or
AT ), with the transition probabilities following :
Ps−1,s =
{
1− θs if λ > λmax ⇒ s = I
θs if λ < λmin ⇒ s = AT
(4)
Thus,
V0(s/s− 1 = I) = (f(I, I) + δV0(s = I/s− 1 = I))PI,I + (f(I, A
T )
+δV0((s = A
T /s− 1 = I))PI,AT
=(1− θs)(Ws − (1 + rs) + δV0(s = I/s− 1 = I))
+θs(δV0(s = A
T /s− 1 = I))
– For
{
s− 1 = Ai, i = T to 2
}
, the chain stays for T − 1 periods in its current state before the to
leave. Thus, the only accessible state from the state Ai is Ai−1, with an almost sure probability worth 1
(PAi,Ai−1 = 1).
– For
{
s− 1 = A1
}
, according to the hypothesis (H6), we have γ the transition probability from A1 to
B1(PA1,B1 = γ) and 1− γ to stay in A1 (PA1,A1 = 1− γ). We will study for the Markov chain (Xt, t ≥ 1)
on a state space S the time spent in the state A1 before leaving it. We suppose to fix the ideas X0 = A1
almost surely and we write τ = {inf(t) ≥ 1, Xt 6= A1} the first moment to be a loan recipient after being
in the A1 state, then τ is a time out.
We have of course, for t = 1 :
PA1(τ = 1) = PA1(X1 6= A
1) = 1− p(A1, A1) = 1− γ
And more generally, fort ≥ 2 :
PA1(τ = t) = PA1(X1 = A
1, X2 = A
1, . . . , Xt−1 = A
1, Xt 6= A
1)
=
∑
k≥0 E(P(m = k)F (Xk, Xk+1, . . . , Xk+t/Xk = s))
=PA1(X1 = A
1, X2 = A
1, . . . , Xt−1 = A
1
t )
−PA1(X1 = A
1, X2 = A
1, . . . , Xt−1 = A
1, Xt = A
1)
=((p(A1, A1))t−1)− ((p(A1, A1))t)
=((p(A1, A1))t−1)(1− p(A1, A1)) = ((1− γ)t−1)γ
=V0(s/s− 1)
The law of τ is therefore a geometrical law. As F (X0, X1, . . .) = δτF (Xτ , Xτ+1, . . .) and after this
who is before :
PA1(τ = t) = E(F (X0, X1, . . .)/X0 = A
1) = A1)
=E(E(δτF (Xτ , Xτ+1, . . .)/X0 = A
1, . . . , Xτ−1 = A
1, Xτ = s)/X0 = A
1)
=E(E(δτF (Xτ , Xτ+1, . . .)/Xτ = s)/X0 = A
1)
E(δτV0(s/s− 1 = B)/X0 = A
1)
=E(δτV0(s/s− 1 = B))
=((p(A1, A1))t−1)(1− p(A1, A1)) = ((1− γ)t−1)γ
=V0(s/s− 1 = B)E(δ
τ )
Gold E(δτ ) =
∑
k≥1 δ
k(1− γ)k−1γ = δγ
∑
k≥1(δ(1− γ))
k−1 = δγ1−δ(1−γ) , by crossing to the limit.
To achieve the desired result, the quantity must then be calculated V0(s/s− 1 = B1).
V0(s/s− 1 = B1) =α
l
s(Ws − ((1 + rs) + C + (p ∗ d)) + δV0(s = B1/s− 1 = B1))
+(1− αs)(δV0(s = AT /s− 1 = B1))
=αls(Ws − ((1 + rs) + C + (p ∗ d))) + α
l
sδV0(s/s− 1 = B1)
+(1− αs)δTV0(s/s− 1 = B1)E(δτ )
V0(s/s− 1 = B1) =αls(Ws − ((1 + rs) + C + (p ∗ d)))
1
(1−αlsδ)−(1−αs)δ
TE(δτ )
=
1
1−αlsδ−(1−αs)δ
T δγ
1−δ(1−γ)
αls(Ws − ((1 + rs) + C + (p ∗ d)))
=
1
(1−αlsδ)(1−δ(1−γ))−γ(1−αs)δ
T+1
1−δ(1−γ)
αls(Ws − ((1 + rs) + C + (p ∗ d)))
=
1−δ(1−γ)
(1−αlsδ)(1−δ(1−γ))−γ(1−αs)δ
T+1α
l
s(Ws − ((1 + rs) + C + (p ∗ d)))
And
V0(s/s− 1 = B1) = α
h
s (Ws − ((1 + rs) + C) + δV0(s = B2/s− 1 = B1))
=
αhs
1−δαhs
(Ws − ((1 + rs) + C))
By doing the same for V0(s/s− 1 = B2) and V0(s/s− 1 = I), we get :
V0(s/s− 1 = B2) =
1−δ(1−γ)
1−δ(1−γ)−βsδ(1−δ(1−γ))+γ(1−βs)δT+1
βs(Ws − (1 + rs + C))
V0(s/s− 1 = I) =
1−δ(1−γ)
(1−δ(1−γ))(1−δ(1−θs))−γθsδT+1
(1− θs)(Ws − ((1 + r¯s) + C))
Where, finally :
Théorème 1. :
In the individual loan model defined by the Markov chain (Xt, t ≥ 1) with values in a state space S, the
total expected profit of a borrower who is in the s state at the time t is given by :
Vt(s/s− 1 = B) =


if (s, s− 1) = (B1, B1), d = 1 at 3 :
1−δ(1−γ)
(1−αlsδ)(1−δ(1−γ))−γ(1−αs)δ
T+1α
l
s(Ws − ((1 + rs) + C + (p ∗ d)))
if (s, s− 1) = (B2, B1) :
αhs
1−δαhs
(Ws − ((1 + rs) + C))
if (s, s− 1) = (I,B2) :
1−δ(1−γ)
1−δ(1−γ)−βsδ(1−δ(1−γ))+γ(1−βs)δT+1
βs(Ws − (1 + rs + C))
if (s, s− 1) = (I, I) :
1−δ(1−γ)
(1−δ(1−γ))(1−δ(1−θs))−γθsδT+1
(1− θs)(Ws − ((1 + r¯s) + C))
if (s, s− 1) = (Ai, I), i = T, 1 :
γδi
(1−δ(1−γ))(1−δ(1−θs))−γθsδT+1
(1− θs)(Ws − ((1 + r¯s) + C))
(5)
Since the transition probabilities do not depend on time, the total expected profit is a random variable
function dependent on the possible states of nature (Hypothesis H2) and the interest rate rs.
4.2. At the level of the MFI
Through the dynamic incentive, for a borrower who repays at each time its loan, the credits are granted in
a repetitive and progressive way, for amounts adapted to the capacities of its management. On the other hand,
the MFI stops lending to the one who exceeds the number of allowed defaults. By nature, microfinance has
to cover its costs with the proceeds of their activities. To achieve this, among the criteria for granting loans,
the MFI focuses on the expected future profit of a loan applicant to guard against the risk of non-repayment.
By granting credit only to the so-called good borrowers, the total expected profit of an MFI is determined as
the result of their intertemporal investments.
Corollaire 1. : In the individual loan model defined by the Markov chain (Xt, t ≥ 1) with values in a state
space S, the expected total profit of the MFI that is in the state s at time t is given by :
Vt(s/s− 1 = B) =


if (s, s− 1) = (B1, B1), d = 1 at 3 :
1−δ(1−γ)
(1−αlsδ)(1−δ(1−γ))−γ(1−αs)δ
T+1 (α
l
s(1 + rs)− (1 + zs))
if (s, s− 1) = (B2, B1) :
αhs
1−δαhs
(αhs (1 + rs)− (1 + zs))
if (s, s− 1) = (I,B2) :
1−δ(1−γ)
1−δ(1−γ)−βsδ(1−δ(1−γ))+γ(1−βs)δT+1
(βs(1 + rs)− (1 + zs))
if (s, s− 1) = (I, I) :
1−δ(1−γ)
(1−δ(1−γ))(1−δ(1−θs))−γθsδT+1
((1− θs)(1 + r¯s)− (1 + zs))
if (s, s− 1) = (Ai, I), i = T, 1 :
γδi
(1−δ(1−γ))(1−δ(1−θs))−γθsδT+1
((1− θs)(1 + r¯s)− (1 + zs))
(6)
The proof of this corollary is the same as the preceding theorem.
4.3. Algorithmic illustration
Let W 0s , C, rs and us input values.
1) Calculate αs
2) Calculate λ and test the threshold value.
3) Funding Decision (Granted or Not Granted).
4) Refund test :
a) If d > 4 then the borrower is excluded ;
b) If d ∈ [1, 3] then calculate V (s, s− 1) and go to step 5a ;
c) If d = 0 then calculate V (s′, s− 1) and go to step 5b.
5) New funding request :
a) W ts = W t−1s + V (s, s− 1)
b) W ts = W t−1s + V (s′, s− 1)
6) Go back to step 1 and so on.
5. Discussions
At the initial moment, the borrower submits his financing request to the institution of his free choice.
The institution in turn undertakes to scrutinize the eligibility of the application. At this point, the parameter
λ modeling the future behavior of the borrower allows you to choose between the state B1 or A1 where
the borrower will land. The probability of applying for credit granted depends on γ, with γ = 1 − 1
λ
(the
existence condition of λ was given in the previous section) . The higher the λ parameter, the greater the
chance of the borrower having a loan. The value of γ has hitherto been estimated from historical data by the
institution. As for us, we assign a value to this parameter based on the future success of the borrower. Our
model therefore leaves no guesswork as to the values taken from its parameters. By estimating the expected
gross wealth Ws in t + 1, our model is similar to a decision tree that analyzes itself beginning with the end
and going back in time.
We found that V (A1, I) <<< V (B1, B1) < V (B2, B1) < V (I,B2) < V (I, I) in both camps. Results
supported by those of Osman Khodr and Francine Diener (2015) [2]. On the other hand, our results are
opposed to those found by Nahla Dhib, Francine Diener and Marc Diener (2013) [3] who in their four
states model affirm that, whatever the factor of actualization, "for a micro business person with diminishing
returns, his flow in the initial state is always profitable, while he realizes a V value in the weak and sometimes
negative I state ".
Our model thus constructed satisfies all the hypotheses presented in this article. Our results show that the
Microfinance institution is in symbiosis with its customers. Therefore, in order to maintain this relationship
in perpetuity, microfinance is always looking for a stable credit granting system. The stability of the system
means that the initial probability law towards which the system evolves remains unchanged over time. The
Markov chain watched from the initial moment has the same law as the Markov chain watched from any
instant t. We have therefore constructed a model tending towards a stationary distribution whatever the initial
distribution of the beneficiaries, a result which is confirmed by those of Osman Khodr (2011) [4].
Every model is not free of limits. Our model does not claim in any way to remove the uncertainty
associated with the valuation of future gross wealth that is part of the risk inherent in the granting of credit. In
this respect, we have assumed that the expected gross wealth is a random variable without paying particular
attention to its determination. In addition, the threshold values of the parameter λ are subjective values. The
fate of the borrower costs a lot : a large range of threshold value penalizes the borrower (i.e λmax high). It is
clear that, whatever the threshold value, this parameter puts the decision maker neither in a pessimistic state
nor in an optimistic state. The specificity of the probability distribution of the Ws random variable deserves
to be underlined : W ts = W t−1s + Vt(s/s − 1) + ǫt, with ǫt 7−→ N (0, σW ). The expected gross wealth of
the year t is equal to the gross wealth of the year t−1 plus the expected net profit of the year t and a random
variation with a distribution of zero mean and σW standard deviation.
6. Conclusion
This article is a proposal for a decision-making model that is getting closer and closer to the reality of
microfinance. The profit patterns that can be achieved, whether from the borrower or lender point of view,
depend on the set of possible states of nature. For this purpose, five profits are possible to determine as the
borrower moves from one state to another.
The introduction of the parameter λ in this model avoids risk aversion (underestimation or overvaluation
of the borrower). For the case of group loan, it will be the subject of another article later.
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